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In developed countries governments aim to increase the market share of organic products. Assuming 
that organic farming creates a positive externality, we address the question of how this environmental 
benefit can be internalized best. Using the concept of heterogeneous producers and consumers we 
compare two policy options to enhance organic supply and demand with respect to their efficiency and 
distributional effect: First, we analyze the effect of a supply-side oriented policy like a subsidy on 
organic production. Second, we compare this policy measure to a demand-side oriented information 
policy, which aims to enhance the acceptance and identification of an organic food label. Third, we 
assume  a  mix  of  both  policy  measures.  The  main  findings  of  this  paper  are  that  conventional 
consumers and organic producers and consumers experience a gain in welfare. The efficiency of any 
policy  measure  considered  strongly  depends  on  the  utility  enhancement  experienced  by  organic 
consumers due to an information policy and the costs of transferring the information to the consumer. 
 
Keywords: organic food, labeling, production subsidy, information policy, welfare 
JEL: D61, D62, L15, Q18 
1 Introduction 
Though still small in absolute terms, organic markets are rapidly growing in developed countries. 
Organic food retail sales in the U.S. were estimated at $7.8 billion in 2000 with an average growth rate 
over the past 10 years of 23% per annum. Industry analysts forecast the sector to be worth $20 billion 
by 2005 (USDA, 2004). The situation is similar to the European Union (EU). These increases occur 
for several reasons: First, due to increasing incomes and repeated food scares consumer preferences 
for food with specific characteristics increase. Second, spurred by budgetary problems and pressure 
through  international  trade  agreements  some  countries  are  trying  to  get  rid  of  subsidized  surplus 
production  by  giving  incentives  to  use  less intensive  agricultural  production  techniques including 
organic farming. Furthermore, organic farming is promoted as a method to decrease the negative 
external  costs  of  agricultural  production  and  to  increase  animal  welfare.  Finally,  though  not 
scientifically verified, consumption of organic products is sometimes promoted and/or perceived as 
being healthier. 
Especially in Europe governments at the national and the EU level are trying to promote organic 
farming. For examples, currently the EU is discussing and developing a European Action Plan for 
Organic Food and Farming. Similarly, in an answer to the BSE crisis in 2001-2002, the German 
Minister of Consumer Protection, Nutrition and Agriculture has declared the goal to increase the share 
of organic products in Germany from 5% today to 20% in 2010. 
Assuming that such an increase in the market share of organic farming is beneficial to society and 
desired, the question remains how such a goal can be reached most efficiently. To partly answer this 
question is the aim of this paper. In particular, we discuss the efficiency of two alternative policies 
commonly used: the supply-side oriented policy of subsidizing organic production versus a demand-
side oriented policy of public expenditures to promote the consumption of organic products through 
information  and  advertising.  Examples  of  subsidizing  organic  production  are  agri-environmental 
programs in the EU, which are jointly sponsored by the European Commission and the member states. 
An example of an information policy on the demand side is the German program “Organic Farming” 
of the German Ministry of Consumer Protection, Nutrition and Agriculture with a budget of €20 
million each year between 2001 and 2007. In this program a common label of organic products is 
announced to consumers with the aim to reinforce its recognition and acceptance. 
In this paper we build a theoretical model accounting for heterogeneous consumers and producers 
to compare these two policy measures concerning their efficiency and welfare distribution. We assume 
that the overall goal of these two policy measures is to internalize the positive external effect of 
organic production and thereby to increase the organic market share by a certain amount. In a second 
step, we apply a combination of a subsidy and an information policy to obtain the desired organic 
share under the assumption of welfare maximization.   2 
2 Basic Model 
In  an  attempt  to  model  the  welfare  effects  of  these  two  policy  measures  on  a  group  of 
heterogeneous consumers and heterogeneous producers at the same time we combine two models, one 
described in Giannakas (2002) considering consumer heterogeneity and one described in Fulton and 
Keyowski (1999) considering producer heterogeneity. Since organic products can be characterized as 
credence goods, whose quality can not be evaluated by consumers even after consumption (Darby and 
Karni, 1973), the usual instruments to transfer the credence good into a search good and to circumvent 
supply-side market failures when conventional and organic products are not segregated, is labeling and 
certification of organic food. While Giannakas (2002) analyses the benefits of introducing an organic 
label,  we  discuss  the  situation  where  labeling  of  organic  products  has  already  been  introduced. 
Therefore,  consumers  can  easily  detect  the  credence  attributes  of  the  products.  Additionally,  we 
assume that there is a perfect testing system in place, such that there is no scope for moral hazard or 
adverse selection. Furthermore, we assume autarky and perfect competition with marketing margins 
equal to zero, i.e. equilibrium prices producers receive equal equilibrium prices consumers pay. The 
analysis can easily be extended by introducing positive marketing margins of constant proportions to 
the wholesale or retail level without changing the qualitative nature of the model (see Fulton and 
Giannakas, 2004). In addition, we consider that organic production implies a positive externality (or 
less of a negative externality) compared to conventional production. 
 
2.1 Consumers’ decisions 
Assume a group of consumers who are heterogeneous with respect to an attribute θ  to take account of 
different  consumer  attitudes  towards  organic  and  conventional  food.  Using  the  model  of  vertical 
product differentiation of Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Giannakas and Fulton (2002) we assume that 
purchasing one unit of the product in question represents a small share of the consumers’ total budget 
and that there are no income effects. Indirect utilities associated with purchasing on unit of the organic 
product  ( o U ),  of the  conventional  product ( c U )  or  of  a  substitute (U
~
)  of  a  consumer  with  the 
differentiating attribute θ  are given by 
 
 
  αθ + − = o o p U U   (1) 
  βθ + − = c c p U U   (2) 
  p U U ~ ~
− =   (3) 
 
 
U  is a per unit base level of utility (i.e. the willingness to pay for the substitute), which is common to 
all consumers. We assume that consumers are uniformly distributed along their preferences  θ  for 
[ ] 1 , 0 ~ θ . The characteristic θ  differs across consumers and captures different willingness to pay for 
the respective product. Parameters α  and  β  are nonnegative utility enhancement factors, which are 
constant  across  all  consumers.  Furthermore,  by  arguing  that  consumers  are  more  heterogeneous 
regarding  the  organic  than  regarding  the  conventional  product,  let  β α > .  Consequently,  the 
maximum willingness to pay for the organic product is  αθ + U  and for the conventional product 
βθ + U . U
~
 is a reservation utility with a reservation price of  p ~ . The reason for introducing the 
substitute is to allow both the conventional or the organic market to expand due to any policy measure. 
If the indirect utility of either the conventional or the organic product falls below this level, consumers 
drop  out  of  the  market  and  enter  the  market  of  the  substitute.  A  further  assumption  is  that 
p p p c o
~ > >   to  capture  the  fact  that  prices  for  organic  foods  are  higher  than  prices  for  their 
conventional counterparts due to higher production costs in organic farming. Finally, we assume that 
c p U U − >
~
  (i.e.  if  ) 0 = θ ,  p pc
~ − > β   and  ( ) β α + − > p po
~   to  allow  for  positive  shares  of 
organic and conventional demand. Graphically, this model is illustrated in figure 1.   3 
For consumers maximizing utility along the differentiating attribute θ , the share of consumers 












= =   (4) 
 
by equating indirect utilities (3) and (2). The marginal consumer located at  1 θ  is indifferent between 
consuming  the  conventional  product  or  leaving  the  market  for  the  substitute.  For  mathematical 
simplicity, let  β α λ − = . The total share of the substitute plus the conventional demand is found by 






c o p p −
= 2    (5) 
 
 
Figure 1. Consumers’ decisions 
 
Likewise, the consumer located at  2 θ  is indifferent between demanding the conventional product or its 















= − =    (6) 
 
 


















b  a 
2 θ   1 θ   1  0 
β  
α  
c p U −  
o p U −  
p U ~ −    4 
2.2 Producers’ decisions 
On  the  supply  side  we  assume  heterogeneity  of  producers  by  introducing  a  differentiating 
attribute ϕ , which comprises factors affecting average production costs. Therefore, similar to Fulton 
and  Keyowski  (1999)  producers  differ  in  the  net  returns  they  receive.  Again,  let  producers  be 
uniformly distributed along the differentiating attribute ϕ  for  [ ] 1 , 0 ~ ϕ , where  0 = ϕ  denotes low 
average  production  costs  and  1 = ϕ   high  average  production  costs.  The  profit  functions  for  unit 
production of the organic product  o Π ,of the conventional product  c Π  and of an alternative product 
n Π  are given by 
 
 
  ( ) γϕ + − = Π o o o c p    (8) 
  ( ) δϕ + − = Π c c c c p    (9) 
  0 ≥ − = Π n n n c p    (10) 
 
 
o c  and  c c  are base level costs of producing the organic or the conventional product, respectively, 
which are common to all producers irrespective of their location  ϕ . To capture higher production 
costs in organic farming, which include the costs of labeling, certification and monitoring as well, let 
c o c c > . We further assume that γ  and δ  are nonnegative cost enhancement factors and that  γ δ > . 
By this we argue that producers of conventional food are more sensitive to factors like soil quality, 
climate, etc. and require factors like synthetic fertilizers, pesticides, etc., which are not permitted in 
organic production. Thus, the total costs of unit production for a producer located at ϕ  is given by 
γϕ + o c  and  δϕ + c c , respectively. We further assume that  n c o p p p > >  to account for organic 
prices receiving a premium over the conventional product.  n Π  is the profit level of an alternative 
product, which we assume not to be a substitute in consumption. If the profits of organic production 
along the differentiating attribute ϕ  fall below the constant level of  n Π , producers drop out of this 
market and produce something different, yielding a profit of  n Π . Without loss of generality,  n Π  can 
be set to zero. For positive shares, let ( ) ( ) ( ) o o c c o o c p c p c p − < − < − γ
δ . Graphically, producers’ 
decisions are illustrated in figure 2. 
For  the  subsequent  equations  let  γ δ µ − = .  Assuming  profit  maximization  along  the 




  ( ) ( )
µ
ϕ
o o c c S
c
c p c p
x
− − −
= = 1    (11) 
 
 
with the marginal producer located at  1 ϕ  being indifferent between producing conventional or organic 
food. The total market share of conventional and organic production is given by equating (8) and (10): 
 
 
  ( )
γ
ϕ
n o o c p Π − −
= 2    (12) 
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Figure 2. Producers’ decisions 
 
2 ϕ  is the location of the producer who is indifferent between producing organic or an alternative 
product. Subtracting (11) from (12) gives organic supply 
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= − = 2 1    (14) 
 
 
2.3 Market Equilibrium 
Assuming autarky and, hence, equal shares of supply and demand, we calculate equilibrium prices by 
equating  (11)  and  (6)  for  the  conventional  market  and  (13)  and  (7)  for  the  organic  market.  The 
equilibrium price, which is the price producers receive and consumers pay, is given by equation (15) 
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Comparative statics are summarized in table 1. For  β α >  the analysis shows that the greater the 
difference in heterogeneity of consumers subject to the product that maximizes their utility, the more 
organic prices increase and conventional prices decrease, causing the organic premium to rise. To put 
it in another way, the less people differ in their preferences for organic food, the more the difference 
between organic and conventional prices converges to almost zero and the more consumers leave 
organic markets and enter the market for conventional food. 
Looking at the supply side, for  γ δ >  and  c o c c >  an increase in the organic/conventional cost 
factors (base level costs and cost enhancement factors) increases the respective price, and an increase 
in the conventional cost factors reduces the organic price. Conversely, an increase in the organic cost 
factors increases the conventional price. An increase in the conventional cost factors (e.g. due to 
decreasing  soil  quality)  reduces  the  organic  premium  and  induces  farmers  to  convert  to  organic 
farming. 
The total share of the organic and the conventional market taken together increases the more 
organic  and  conventional  consumers  differ  in  their  heterogeneity.  This  means  that  a  greater 
heterogeneity of organic consumers induces some consumers to leave the market for the substitute and 
enter the market for the conventional product, but they cannot fully offset the exit of conventional 
consumers  to  the  organic  market.  Otherwise,  the  total  share  decreases  the  more  organic  and 
conventional  producers  differ  in  their  heterogeneity.  A  greater  heterogeneity  of  conventional 
producers leads to producers dropping out of the organic market and producing the alternative product, 
while the loss in organic producers is more than offset by conventional producers entering the organic 
market. 
 
Table 1. Comparative statics of the basic model 
exogenous  parameters
utility enhancement organic + - + -
utility enhancement conventional - + - +
cost enhancement organic + + - +
cost enhancement conventional - + + -
basic average costs organic + + - +
basic average costs conventional - + + -
+ + - -












Note: Table entries indicate the direction of the change that occurs in the endogenous variable for a 
positive change in the exogenous variable 
 
2.4 Consumer and Producer Welfare and Externalities 
Without any externality in production or consumption the resulting market equilibrium of the organic 
and  the  conventional  product  is  the  first  best  solution  for  a  closed  economy  and  no  government 
intervention is desirable. Consumer welfare is given by area abcd in figure 1 covering the welfare of 
consumers of conventional products and the colored area bcef covering the welfare of consumers of 
organic products. Producer welfare is given by ABCD in figure 2 covering the welfare of conventional 
farmers and the colored area CBEF covering the welfare of organic farmers. Total consumer welfare   7 
in the market is given by the sum of of organic consumer welfare  o CW , conventional consumer 
welfare  c CW , and welfare of consumers of the substitute  a CW  for 












− + − − = + − = ∫ o o o p U d p U CW    (17) 
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θ θ p U d p U CWa    (19) 
 
 
Total  producer  welfare  in  the  market  is  given  by  the  sum  of  organic  producer  welfare  o PW , 
conventional producer welfare  c PW , and producer welfare of the alternative product  n PW : 
 
 









ϕ ϕ ϕ γϕ
ϕ
ϕ
− − − − = − − = ∫ o o o o o c p d c p PW    (20) 









− − = − − =∫ c c c c c c p d c p PW    (21) 






ϕ ϕ n n n d PW    (22) 
 
 
However, there is some empirical evidence that organic production is environmental friendlier 
compared to conventional production (Dabbert et al., 2000). This difference in externalities between 
organic and conventional farming can be modeled either as conventional farming creating a negative 
externality  that does  not occur  with  organic  production  or  as  organic farming  creating  a  positive 
externality that does not occur with conventional production. Following the later and assuming that the 
positive  externality  per  unit  of  organic  production  is  a  constant  (E ),  the  social  profit  curve 
( ) E c p o o o + + − = Π γϕ
*  lies above private profits in figure 2 and the social benefit of organic 
farming (without internalization) is area CEGH in figure 2. Mathematically, the environmental benefit 
is given by 
 
 
  ) ( 1 2 ϕ ϕ − = E EBo    (23) 
 
 
Given  the  positive  externality,  2 1 2 1 θ ϕ ϕ − = −   is  no  longer  the  optimal  market  share  of  organic 
products. Social supply of organic products is 
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c p E c p
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*    (24) 
 
 
with the loss in producer welfare due to the positive external effect covering area JCEI in figure 2.   8 
This gives the usual rational for government intervention in form of subsidies on the supply side 
or promotion of organic products on the demand side. In the following we compare a subsidy on 
organic production that fully internalizes the positive externality with an information policy aimed at 
increasing the utility consumers derive from organic products and thus increasing the share of organic 
food as well. 
 
3 Subsidy on organic production 
In this policy scenario a subsidy  s  is set on each unit of organic food produced yielding a per unit 
profit function of 
 
 




o + + − = Π γϕ    (25) 
 
 
with all other profit and indirect utility functions ((1)-(3) and (9)-(10)) left unchanged and the new 
equilibrium  prices  denoted  by 
S
o p   and 
S
c p ,  respectively.  The  resulting  supply  functions  and  the 
equations for the equilibrium prices are given in the appendix. Welfare of organic producers 
S
o PW  
and the government expenditure function 
S G  are given by 
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ϕ ϕ ϕ γϕ
ϕ
ϕ
− − − + − = + − − = ∫    (26) 
  ( )
S S S s G 1 2 ϕ ϕ − =   (27) 
 
 
with all  other  welfare functions as in the  basic  model  but  with  indices  of  the  equilibrium  prices 
changed and, consequently, changed market boundaries. The total welfare function is given by the 
sum of all consumer and producers welfare functions and the environmental benefit 
S EB , reduced by 
government expenditures denoted by 
S G . Maximizing the total welfare function with respect to the 
subsidy, the first order condition reads  E s =
* . Comparative statics for prices, market shares and 
welfare are summarized in table 2. 
Partial derivatives of prices and quantities with respect to the subsidy s  show that an increase in 
the subsidy on organic production reduces both the organic and conventional price, increases the 
organic share and decreases the conventional share. Additionally, the total share of the conventional 
and  the  organic  market  increases.  Looking  at  the  welfare  functions,  an  increase  in  the  subsidy 
increases total consumer welfare and decreases total producer welfare. Aggregated welfare of organic 
consumers and producers increases for a positive change of the subsidy, whereas aggregated welfare 
of conventional producers and consumers decreases. However, individually conventional consumers 
gain  as  well  due  to  the  decrease  in  the  price  for  the  conventional  product,  and  the  increase  in 
aggregated  organic  consumer  welfare  can  compensate  for  the  loss  in  aggregated  conventional 
consumer  welfare  for  total  consumer  welfare  to  increase.  Therefore,  only  conventional  producers 
experience a loss in individual welfare due to the subsidy, but the increase in organic producer welfare 
cannot fully offset the loss for total producer welfare to increase as well. 
   9 
Table 2. Comparative statics – subsidy and information policy 
subsidy information policy
equilibrium prices - +
- -
market shares + +
- -
- -
consumer welfare + +
- organic + +
- conventional - -
- substitute - -
producer welfare - -
- organic + +
- conventional - -
- alternative - -
o p
c p
s ρ , Ψ
o x
c x




Note: Table entries indicate the direction of the change that occurs in the endogenous variable for a 
positive change in the policy variables 
 
4 Information policy 
Referring to a demand-side oriented policy, the aim of the information policy in this context is to 
increase the identification and acceptance of the label or simply to enhance the trust of consumers in 
the label, which indicates the credence attributes of the organic product. The economics literature 
distinguishes between persuasive and informative advertising. We believe that this kind of information 
policy belongs to the latter category by arguing that not any specific kind of agricultural product is 
advertised but simply the existence of a certain label promoted, which denotes a quality characteristic. 
We emphasize that the economic effect of the information policy can be interpreted as reduced search 
costs for consumers demanding organic products (see for example Nelson, 1970, and Butters, 1977) or 
reduced imperfect information on the demand side. This assumption implies, similar to the results of 
Giannakas (2002) regarding mislabeling of organic products, that labeling per se is a necessary, but 
still an insufficient mean in transferring a credence good into a search good. 
Since any kind of economic modeling of an information policy (or advertising in general) is very 
critical (see, for example, the discussion in Cardon and Pope, 2003), two alternatives are possible: 
First, it might be argued that consumers with a higher differentiating attribute θ  are more sensitive to 
any  information  regarding  organic  products  and,  consequently,  experience  a  higher  utility 
enhancement.  As  α   will  be  further  increased,  this  will  cause  the  o U -curve  to  rotate  counter-
clockwise around the point 
I
o p U −  at  0 = θ  by a certain amount and, thus, increases the willingness 
to pay for the organic product. Alternatively, it can be argued, that all consumers reached by the 
information  policy  experience  a  higher  utility  enhancement  irrespective  of  their  differentiating 
attribute  θ , causing the  o U -curve to shift upwards. For this option we will present the complete 
analysis, which we will use for comparative purposes with the subsidy. For simplicity, let us assume 
that all consumers located along θ  are reached by the information policy with equal probability and 
that getting the information enhances utility, which leads to effective organic demand, provided that 
consumers are located at a high enough θ . Since the information policy takes the form of random 
advertising,  public  expenditures  are,  however,  subject  to  the  probability  to  reach  consumers  (and 
thereby to the intensity to affect consumers’ utility in a certain manner), and subject to the costs of 
transferring the information to the final consumer (see, for example, the model in Butters, 1977). 
To model the effect of the information policy on organic food demand we assume that any utility 
enhancement by reduced search costs and/or enhanced trust in the label enters the consumer’s organic 
utility  function  in  an  additive  way  and  causes  the  function  to  shift  upwards  by  Ψ ρ .  Ψ   is  the 
probability to reach consumers by the information policy (i.e. the intensity of the information policy   10 
and thus the policy variable for this option to increase the organic share) and  ρ  is an exogenously 
given increase in utility once a consumer is reached by the information policy. In other words, all 
consumers reached by the information policy experience a higher utility enhancement irrespective of 
their differentiating attribute θ : 
 
 




o p U U   (28) 
 
Again, the resulting demand functions and equilibrium prices are given in the appendix. Welfare of 
organic consumers is given by 
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All other welfare functions are the same as in the basic model with indices of equilibrium prices as 
well as market boundaries changed. Again, the total welfare function is the sum of all producer and 
consumer  welfare  functions  and  the  positive  external  effect  (environmental  benefit)  with  the 
government expenditure function being subtracted. The government expenditure function (see, for 














I   (30) 
 
 
with  v  being  unit  costs  of  sending  and  ad  (i.e.  actual  costs  of  transferring  the  information  to 
consumers), which are exogenously given to the government. As the total number of consumers in the 
market is θ , and  1 = θ  we can neglect the characteristic θ  in the government expenditure function. 









− = Ψ 1   (31) 
 
 
This means, given any fixed budget available to the government facing unit costs of sending an ad v, 
this  yields  the  probability  set  by  the  government  to  reach  consumers  by  the  information  policy. 
Substituting Ψ  of equation (31) into the total welfare function, the resulting level of total welfare can 
be  compared  to  a  supply-side  oriented  policy  like  the  subsidy.  However,  treating  government 
expenditures endogenously, we calculate the total welfare maximizing probability 
* Ψ , which is given 
in the appendix. 
The comparative statics for the information policy are given in table 2. Partial derivatives of 
prices with respect to the utility enhancement  ρ  show that any utility enhancement of a constant 
amount  for  all  organic  consumers  increases  the  organic  equilibrium  price  and  decreases  the 
conventional price. Likewise, increasing the probability to reach consumers  Ψ  by the information 
policy causes the organic price to increase and the conventional price to decrease. The effect of the 
information policy on individual, aggregated and total welfare is exactly the same as in the case of the 
subsidy. The welfare maximizing probability to reach consumers 
* Ψ  increases for a positive change   11 
of  the  environmental  benefit  E   and  the  utility  enhancement  ρ   with 
* Ψ   approximating  1  and 
decreases for positive changes of unit costs of sending an ad v. 
 
5 Subsidy versus information policy and a combination of both policy measures 
We assume that the main goal of the policy is to attain an organic share of a certain amount with 
either  policy  instrument  (i.e.  with  a  subsidy  on  organic  production,  an information  policy  on the 
demand side or with a combination of both). As noted, the welfare maximizing subsidy  s  equals the 
environmental benefit  E , yielding an organic share of 
S
o x . We now assume that the information 
policy aims to internalize the positive external effect inherent in organic food production by increasing 






= . As the increase in utility  ρ  due to the 
information  policy  is  exogenously  given,  the  probability  to  reach  consumers  Ψ   is  set  by  the 
government to reach the desired organic share. By equating organic demand due to the subsidy and 
organic demand due to the information policy (or by equating the respective organic supply functions) 






= Ψ   (32) 
 
 
This implies that the indirect utility curve of organic consumers 
I
o U  must shift upwards by  Ψ ρ  to 








o + = . Given the 
utility enhancement  ρ , the government will set the corresponding probability Ψ  to reach consumers 
(with  Ψ  being a decreasing function of  ρ ) for organic shares to be equal under the two policy 
scenarios.  Now,  the  organic  and  the  conventional  equilibrium  price  are  constant  for  any  utility 
enhancement  ρ . Given this, organic and conventional aggregate producer welfare, as well as organic 
and conventional aggregate consumer welfare is exactly equal to the subsidy scenario. However, total 
welfare will be different due to government expenditures of the information policy (see equation (30)), 
which  depend  on  the  increase  in  utility  ρ   due  to  the  information  policy  (which  determines  the 
probability Ψ ) and unit costs of sending an ad v.  




+  and the profit function of organic producers 
I S
o
+ Π  being 
 
 
  αθ ρ + Ψ + − =
+ + I S
o
I S
o p U U   (33) 




o + + − = Π
+ + γϕ   (34) 
 
 
In determining corresponding values of the subsidy  s  and of the probability to reach consumers 
Ψ , we, again, consider the goal to enhance the share of the organic market by the same amount as in 
the scenarios of either a subsidy or an information policy. Let 
I S
o x







o x x x
! !
= =
+ . The respective supply and demand functions for this combination of policy 
measures are given in the appendix. Producer welfare functions are the same as in the subsidy scenario 
and consumer welfare functions as in the information policy scenario with indices of prices changed. 
By equating organic demand due to a subsidy and organic demand due to a combination of the policy   12 
measures for any given probability 
I S+ Ψ , the corresponding subsidy as a function of the probability 
( )
I S I S s
+ + Ψ  is given by 
 
 
  ( )
I S I S I S s s
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= Ψ  for any given subsidy 
I S s
+ ). This implies, the higher 
the probability to reach consumers set by the government, the lower will be the corresponding subsidy 
to obtain the goal of 
I S
o x
+ . Comparative statics are summarized in table 3. The change of direction of 
the organic equilibrium price due to the policy variable(s) is the same as in the policy scenario of 
solely an information policy (the organic equilibrium price increases as 
I S+ Ψ  increases), whereas 
partial derivatives of the conventional price with respect to any policy variable are zero. Consequently, 
as the organic market share is constant for all corresponding values of 
I S+ Ψ  and  ( )
I S I S s
+ + Ψ , the 
conventional and residual market shares are constant as well, and consumer and producer welfare 
remains constant for any combination of 
I S+ Ψ  and  ( )
I S I S s
+ + Ψ . 
 
Table 3. Comparative statics - combination subsidy and information policy 
exogenous
- + 0 0 0
- + 0 + 0 0
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Note: Table entries indicate the direction of the change that occurs in the 
endogenous variable for a positive change in the exogenous variables 
 
Keeping the organic share fixed as implemented by equation (35), total welfare maximization can 
be reached by minimizing total government expenditures 
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+ . The probability 
I S+ Ψ
* , which minimizes total government expenditures 
is  given  in  the  appendix  with  the  corresponding  subsidy  as  a  function  of 
I S+ Ψ
*   being 
( )
I S I S I S s s
+ + + Ψ − = Ψ
* * * ρ . The higher (lower) unit costs of sending an ad and the lower (higher) the 
utility  enhancement  of  organic  consumers,  the  more 
I S+ Ψ
*   tends  towards  zero  ( ( )
I S I S s
+ + Ψ
* *  
becomes  negative,  i.e.  a  tax)  and  is  therefore  irrelevant  for  carrying  out  an  information  policy 
(subsidy).  Substituting 
I S+ Ψ
*   and  ( )
I S I S s
+ + Ψ
* *   into  the  equations  for  the  equilibrium  prices, 
comparative statics show that the organic equilibrium price increases (decreases) for a positive change 
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  Table 4 summarizes by means of a numerical example the effect of the different policy measures 
considered. The subsidy  s  in column (2) was set in a way to fully internalize the environmental   13 
benefit, i.e.  E s = , which defines the desired organic share as a reference for the information policy 
and  the  combination  of  policy  measures.  However,  using  an  information  policy  and  maximizing 
welfare with respect to Ψ , this might yield a lower organic share (see column (3)). Column (4) shows 
the situation of an information policy, which does not maximize total welfare, but  Ψ  is set in a way 
for the desired organic share to be reached. Consequently, producer and consumer welfare as well as 
the provision of the environmental benefit are identical. However, total welfare is different due to 
different government expenditures and in this case even lower than in the baseline scenario in column 
(1). Alternatively, assuming a combination of a subsidy on organic production and an information 
policy  at  the  same  time  in  column  (5),  we  determine  the  probability  to  reach  consumers,  which 
minimizes total government expenditures (i.e. maximizes total welfare) conditional on the desired 
organic share to be reached with the new subsidy being a function of this probability. Again, the 
conventional equilibrium price remains at the level of the scenarios with a single policy, but with the 
organic equilibrium price being the price of the information policy reduced by the subsidy of the 
policy  mix scenario. As the expenditure minimizing probability is quite low in this example, the 
organic equilibrium price is lower than the respective price in the basic model. 
 
Table 4. Effect of organic food policies on prices, market shares and welfare 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
exogenous parameters Basic Subsidy InfoPol InfoPol Subsidy + InfoPol
20.00
9.00
4.00   organic supply/demand 0.34 0.41 0.38 0.41 0.41
3.00   conventional supply/demand 0.56 0.51 0.54 0.51 0.51
6.00   sum 0.90 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
8.00   organic price 10.70 10.27 10.74 10.77 10.50
3.00   conventional price 7.39 7.31 7.35 7.31 7.31
0.00   welfare:
0.50   consumers organic 5.67 6.90 6.32 6.90 6.90
7.00 conventional 7.96 7.21 7.56 7.21 7.21
0.60 residual 1.28 1.01 1.14 1.01 1.01
0.15   total consumer 14.91 15.12 15.02 15.12 15.12
  producers organic 0.17 0.25 0.21 0.25 0.25
conventional 1.52 1.42 1.47 1.42 1.42
residual 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
  total producer 1.69 1.67 1.68 1.67 1.67
  gov. expenditures - 0.20 0.09 0.27 0.18
  environm. benefit 0.17 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.20
































Using the numerical values of all exogenous parameters as in table 4, figure 3 denotes the relevant 
area for carrying out either a subsidy or an information policy (as a single policy measure) depending 
on the utility enhancement  ρ  and unit costs of sending an ad  v. In the grey area above the lower 
continuous line an information policy without any constraint on the organic share causes a higher total 
welfare than a subsidy. However, for the desired organic share as defined by the subsidy to be reached 
requires a higher exogenously given utility enhancement  ρ  as indicated by the dark grey area above 
the upper continuous line. The relevant area for carrying out an information policy subject to the 
constraint on the desired organic share is given by the area above the dashed line. For all combinations 
of  ρ  and  v in the relevant area, total welfare is lower than for an information policy without this 
constraint.  Consequently,  using  an  information  policy  as  a  single  policy  measure  without  any 
constraint on the organic share, only in the dark grey area the environmental benefit is (more than) 
fully internalized. 
  In figure 4 the combination of an information policy with a subsidy, which assumes total welfare 
maximization and the desired organic share to be reached, is added to the previous figure. The grey 
area shows the relevant combinations of  ρ  and  v for carrying out a combination of both policy 
measures (i.e.  ( ) 0
* * > Ψ
+ + I S I S s  and  [ ] 1 , 0
* ∈ Ψ
+I S ). Within this grey area, total welfare due to the 
combination of an information policy and a subsidy is higher than total welfare for a subsidy and 
either kind of information policy, both as a single policy measure.   14 
  To summarize, for high (exogenously given) utility enhancements of organic consumers due to 
an information policy and low unit costs of sending an ad, an information policy as a single policy 
measure maximizes total welfare and provides an even higher organic share than the share as indicated 
by a subsidy. Conversely, if the utility enhancement is quite low and unit costs of sending an ad rather 
high, a subsidy may be superior in regard to welfare maximization. For utility enhancements and unit 
costs of sending an ad in between these two extreme positions, a combination of a subsidy with an 
information policy might require less resources than each of these instruments if applied alone and 
















Figure 3. Relevant area for carrying out either a subsidy or an information policy 
























Figure 4. Choice of policy for total welfare maximization 
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6 Conclusion 
In many developed economies, organic markets are rapidly growing for reasons such as increasing 
incomes,  repeated  food  scares,  pressure  through  international  trade  agreements,  environmental 
benefits of organic production, the perception of organic food as being healthier, etc. Especially in 
Europe governments at the national and the EU level are trying to increase the share of organic 
farming, either by subsidizing organic production on the supply side or by promoting organic food on 
the demand side. 
Similar  to  Fulton  and  Giannakas  (2004),  we  combine  two  models,  one  with  heterogeneous 
consumers  having  different  preferences  regarding  organic  or  conventional  products  and  one  with 
heterogeneous  producers  facing  different  average  production  costs.  Assuming  that  organic  food 
production  creates  a  positive  externality,  for  example  in  regard  to  environment  or  landscape,  we 
analyze  the  effectiveness  of  two  policy  measures  in  internalizing  the  environmental  benefit  and 
thereby increasing the organic share by a certain amount: First, a (constant) subsidy per unit of the 
organic product produced and, second, an information policy aimed at enhancing the acceptance and 
identification of the label on organic food and thereby raising consumers’ indirect utilities. Regarding 
the information  policy  we  assume  that  organic  consumers’  indirect  utility  will  be  enhanced  by  a 
certain  amount  (e.g.  through  reduced  search  costs  for  consumers  to  identify  organic  products  or 
enhanced trust in the label) depending on the intensity of the information provided. This is modeled by 
introducing a probability, which is set by the government to reach consumers by the information 
policy. We assume that the information policy enhances utility of an equal amount for all consumers 
reached. Finally, we consider a mix of both policy measures assuming that it is the aim of the policy to 
achieve the desired organic market share under the criterion of maximized total welfare. 
The  basic  model  shows  that  the  more  organic  and  conventional  consumers  differ  in  their 
preferences for organic and conventional food, and the less organic and conventional producers differ 
in their average production costs, the higher will be the organic premium. This will cause the organic 
market share to increase and the conventional market share to decrease. Assuming the existence of a 
residual market (i.e. a substitute on the demand side, and a market for an alternative product on the 
supply side) the model indicates an increase in the total share of organic and conventional food. 
Having  determined  the  desired  organic  share  by  means  of  a  subsidy  as  a  reference,  which 
perfectly internalizes the environmental benefit, an information policy can alternatively be used to 
obtain an organic share of the same amount. For the organic shares to be equal under the two different 
policy scenarios, we assume that the information policy considers the actual increase in utility of 
organic consumers due to the provision of further information and accordingly adjusts its intensity in 
providing this information. Additionally, we determine the information policy, which maximizes total 
welfare without restricting the organic share. Assuming a combination of the two policy measures we 
determine  the  corresponding  subsidy  and  intensity  of  the  information  policy,  which  leads  to  the 
desired organic share and thereby maximizes total welfare. 
Comparing  equilibrium  prices,  the  model  shows  that  under  each  policy  considered,  the 
conventional price will decrease. The organic equilibrium price is lowered due to the subsidy on 
organic production, whereas the organic premium increased due to an information policy. The higher 
the increase in utility of consumers after having been exposed to the information, the less intense the 
information policy has to be if the desired organic share has to be reached. Conversely, the welfare 
maximizing probability to reach consumers increases in the utility enhancement of organic consumers. 
Applying a mix of both policy measures aimed at reaching the desired organic share and maximizing 
total  welfare,  the  change  of  direction  of  the  organic  equilibrium  price  depends  on  the  utility 
enhancement of organic consumers and on unit costs of sending an ad. Like the welfare maximizing 
information  policy,  the  higher  the  utility  enhancement  and  the  lower  the  costs  to  transfer  the 
information to consumers, the higher will be the intensity of the information policy. The higher this 
intensity, the lower will be the corresponding subsidy and the higher will be the organic price. 
Under each policy option considered, the total share of organic and conventional food taken 
together  increases.  Total  welfare  of  consumers  increases,  whereas  total  welfare  of  producers 
decreases. In detail, aggregated welfare of organic producers and consumers is thereby enhanced, 
while  aggregated  welfare  of  conventional  producers  and  consumers  is  lowered.  However,  given 
decreasing  prices  for  the  conventional  product,  conventional  consumers  gain  individually. 
Consequently, the only loss in individual welfare is experienced by conventional producers. Assuming   16 
that it is the goal to enhance the organic market share with a subsidy, with an information policy or 
with a combination of both policy instruments by the same amount, producer and consumer welfare as 
well as the provision of the environmental benefit is the same under each policy option. However, total 
government expenditures will be different, and therefore, the level of total welfare, depending on the 
one  hand  on  the  actual  increase  in  utility  due  to  the  information  policy,  which  determines  the 
necessary intensity of the information policy and on the other hand on the actual costs of transferring 
the information to consumers. 
Comparing  the  different  policy  options  regarding  total  welfare,  the  model  shows  that  an 
information policy can be more efficient than any other policy considered given substantially high 
increases in utility of organic consumers once they get the information and, of course, given low costs 
of transferring this information to consumers. For the opposite, a subsidy might be the better policy. 
For any combination of utility enhancements and unit costs of sending an ad in between these two 
extreme positions a combination of a subsidy with an information policy might be more efficient. 
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Appendix 
Subsidy 
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Conventional demand: 
βλ











, + Ψ − −
= − =  






































γ µ γ β γδ βγ αδ αβ
αγδ αβγ γ β αγ
β λ
ρ
µ γ β γδ βγ αδ αβ














































γ µ γ β γδ βγ αδ αβ
βγδ αβγ γ β βγ
β λ
ρ
µ γ β γδ βγ αδ αβ








Welfare maximizing probability to reach consumers: 
A
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Combination of subsidy and information policy 
Conventional supply:  ( ) ( )
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